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I. Introduction 
Consider the following scenario.  
 
Messiah: Al is a good man. He leads a fulfilling life. Those around him 
appreciate him and treat him with respect. Shortly before his death, he 
makes an unsettling discovery. Unbeknownst to him, those in his 
community believe he is a Messiah: someone chosen by God, with innate 
virtue, and deserving of unconditional respect. As it happens, Al really is a 
good man, worthy of respect. But if, counterfactually, his behaviour and 
personality were disagreeable, those around him would continue to be 
positively disposed towards him. They all interpret Al’s behaviour through 
the lens of the “Messiah-script,” without seeing him for who he really is.   
 
If I were Al, I would be troubled by the discovery. I would start questioning much 
of what I had found valuable in my life. Did my near and dear really know me? Did 
I ever have any influence on their perception of me? Did my partner love me 
 
*  I am grateful to Alice Baderin, Samuel Bruce, Chiara Cordelli, Rowan Cruft, Tom Dougherty, 
Anca Gheaus, Christian List, Joseph Mazor, Maeve McKeown, Alasia Nuti, Tom Parr, Miriam 
Ronzoni and the reviewers of this paper, as well as JPP’s editors, for very helpful written comments. 
I have also greatly benefited from discussion at the Nuffield Political Theory Workshop, the UCL 
Legal and Political Theory Seminar, the Cambridge Moral Sciences Club, the Frankfurt Political 
Theory Colloquium, the Amsterdam Graduate Conference in Political Theory, and the SIFA 
Conference (Novara). I acknowledge the support of the Leverhulme Trust (Philip Leverhulme 
Prize). As the article has a rather long history, I am not sure I have kept track of everyone who 
should be thanked. My sincere apologies to those I may have inadvertently left out. 
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because of me, or because they thought I was “the chosen one”? And what about 
my friends and colleagues?  
 Even if Al led what looks like a good life, something important was missing 
from it: his agency made no difference to the attitudes and behaviour of those he 
interacted with. For them, he was virtuous by default, not by virtue of his conduct. 
To that extent, Al lacked the power to construct his outward—i.e., “public”—
identity. His public identity was a function of the Messiah script, not of his 
behaviour and choices. He was public-identity disempowered. 
I have presented this fictional scenario to introduce the concept of public-
identity disempowerment. My aim in this paper is to explain this concept and to 
demonstrate its relevance to the moral evaluation of real-world social interactions, 
not just of fictional ones.1 I show that public-identity disempowerment often lies 
behind prejudice, bullying, cultural exclusion, and stereotyping, and argue that it 
sheds light on morally significant features of these phenomena. I proceed as 
follows. In the first part of the paper—Sections II and III—I set out a framework 
mapping the concept of public-identity disempowerment. I then focus on a 
particularly morally significant form of such disempowerment: “transparency-
appraisal disempowerment.” This is the disempowerment suffered by those who 
lack the power to show themselves for the kinds of people they are.  
In the second part of the paper, I explore the axiological and normative 
dimensions of transparency-appraisal disempowerment. In Sections IV and V, I 
argue that transparency-appraisal disempowerment is non-instrumentally bad for 
its victims, because it prevents them from enjoying the good of socially effective 
 
1  There is, of course, much literature on the relationship between power and identity (e.g., 
MacKinnon 1987, chap. 16; Langton 1993; Fricker 2007; Fanon 2008), including discussions of 
how dominant majorities sometimes impose particular identities on disadvantaged minorities (e.g., 
Laborde 2008, 10; Taylor 1994; Crenshaw 1991, 1297; Lawrence 2003; MacKinnon 1989, 140; cf. 
Jütten 2016). Instances of what I call public-identity disempowerment have therefore not gone 
unnoticed. My aim, however, is to develop a comprehensive framework capturing the phenomenon 
of public-identity disempowerment in its multifarious forms.  
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practical agency. I then outline the considerations that bear on whether any instance 
of such disempowerment is not only bad, but also wrong. In Section VI, I consider 
the implications of my analysis for the practice of statistical discrimination. Section 
VII concludes.  
 
II. What is public-identity disempowerment? 
I begin by clarifying what I mean by identity. I then distinguish between different 
perspectives from which identity judgements can be made. Finally, I discuss the 
power to construct one’s public identity and the lack thereof.  
 
Identity and identity-defining properties 
Asking about a person’s identity is equivalent to asking: Who is this person? 
Answering involves attributing a certain set of identity-relevant properties to them. 
Such attributions presuppose a categorization framework: a system of properties 
deemed relevant for identity definition. Examples of such properties may include: 
white vs other ethnic background, religious vs nonreligious, friendly vs unfriendly, 
dangerous vs harmless, tall vs short, etc.  
 Different categorization frameworks may contain different sets of 
properties or stipulate different satisfaction-conditions for the same property—i.e., 
different specifications of what it takes for someone to exhibit that property. For 
example, prior to the invention of computers, the property “being a computer 
expert” was not part of our categorization frameworks. Or else, consider how the 
satisfaction-conditions for exhibiting the property “being polite” might vary across 
categorization frameworks, insofar as politeness norms differ across cultures. 
Given these differences, identity judgements are always framework-dependent. 
That is, offering an account of a person’s identity involves classifying them in terms 
of the properties contained in a given categorization framework.  
As far as those properties are concerned, it is useful to distinguish between 
appraisal properties and descriptive ones. Appraisal properties convey evaluations 
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of an agent’s character and actions. They are the building blocks of answers to the 
question: “What kind of person are they?” Examples of appraisal properties include: 
kindness, trustworthiness, violence, dangerousness, hypocrisy, loyalty, 
conscientiousness, and courage, to name but a few.  
 Descriptive properties, by contrast, lack evaluative content. Examples of 
descriptive properties include being of Malaysian or Italian descent, born in Canada 
or New Zealand, with dark or blonde hair, married or unmarried, a teacher or an 
engineer, and so forth.  
 The distinction between appraisal and descriptive properties matters insofar 
as the former, but not the latter, can aptly trigger reactive attitudes on the part of 
others, such as praise, blame, resentment, admiration, indignation, contempt, 
shame, and so on (Strawson 1962; Shoemaker 2013). Appraisal properties—unlike 
purely descriptive ones—mark the quality of our agency as persons. As we shall 
see, this gives them special significance in the process of identity-ascription.  
 
Objective, subjective, and public identity 
Offering an account of a person’s identity, I have suggested, involves classifying 
them in terms of the properties contained in a given categorization framework. Such 
classification exercises may be carried out from multiple perspectives. Depending 
on the relevant perspective, we can distinguish between three types of identity: 
subjective, public (inter-subjective), and objective identity (Weigert 1986). 
Subjective identity denotes one’s own conception of who one is: the bundle of 
properties one attributes to oneself. Public identity refers to who one is perceived 
to be by a given group of individuals: a given public. Objective identity denotes the 
bundle of properties one actually possesses—“who one is”—relative to a 
sufficiently rich and nuanced categorization framework.2  So, for example, it is 
 
2  If the categorization framework is not sufficiently rich and nuanced—e.g., certain important 
properties are missing from it—then one’s identity under a correct application of that framework 
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possible for someone to consider himself very generous (subjective identity), while 
he is in fact rather stingy (objective identity), and is perceived as such by friends 
and family (public identity relative to the group of “near and dear”). 
Note that the notion of objective identity does not presuppose an immutable 
self, detached from social processes. One’s objective identity is undoubtedly the 
product of socialization and may evolve over time. All the notion of an objective 
identity implies is that, at any given time, and relative to a sufficiently nuanced 
categorization framework, there is a truth of the matter about which of the 
properties within that framework an agent possesses. 
Similarly, in drawing the distinction between subjective, objective, and 
public identity, I am not implying that our self-conception is impervious to the way 
others think of us—which would be implausible.3 My only contention is that this 
distinction is a useful analytical tool, and one implicit in our common-sense identity 
talk, such as when we say: “He is deluded about who he is” or “Now she is revealing 
her true colours” or “It’s so unfortunate, people think he is full of himself and 
distant, when in fact he is just extremely shy,” and so forth.  
With this conceptual framework in place, we can now turn to analysing the 
relationship between our agency on the one hand, and our public identity on the 
other. 
  
Public-identity power and disempowerment 
As our intuitive reactions to Al’s predicament in Messiah suggest, we—as agents 
and social beings—have reason to value possessing some control over our public 
identity: over what others think of us. Call this “public-identity power.” Such 
control cannot and need not be unlimited. For instance, it is unclear whether we 
 
will not accurately reflect who one is. For instance, under a framework that lacked the property of 
integrity, the identity of a person who truly has integrity would be systematically mischaracterized. 
3 For discussion of how individuals conform to the public identities ascribed to them see, e.g., 
Fricker (2007, 56–57) and Taylor (1994, 25).  
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should lament the fact that someone lacks the power to deceive others about his 
identity. To be sure, possessing this power may be prudentially advantageous: 
suppose he is a criminal, yet he succeeds in making others believe that he is an 
honest professional. Be that as it may, his lacking this power doesn’t seem to raise 
any prima facie moral concern, at least against the backdrop of reasonably just 
circumstances. Similarly, we shouldn’t be worried if someone who is pathologically 
delusional about her identity does not succeed in constructing a public identity that 
matches her (delusional) subjective identity. No moral “alarm bells” should go off 
if, say, I sincerely believe I am the U.S. President, yet, no matter how hard I try, 
others continue to believe that I am a delusional academic. 
 While these forms of public-identity power may be of arguable significance, 
others matter a great deal, and their absence should trigger immediate moral 
concern. I call them “privacy public-identity power” and “transparency public-
identity power.” 
 
Privacy public-identity power: the power to keep one’s objective identity (or 
aspects thereof) private. 
 
Transparency public-identity power: the power effectively to reveal one’s 
objective identity (or aspects thereof).4  
 
Combining these two categories with the distinction between descriptive and 




4 Compare the notion of “agential identities,” defined as the “self-identities we make available to 







Figure 1: Types of public-identity power 
 
It seems plain that all four types of public-identity power matter, and that the 
corresponding forms of disempowerment should be cause for moral concern. Much 
could be said about each of them, but the strictures of a single paper call for a 
narrower focus. In what follows, I will concentrate on one type of public-identity 
power only, namely that described in the bottom-right quadrant of our matrix. I call 
it “transparency-appraisal public-identity power” (“transparency-appraisal power,” 
for short). I have two main reasons for narrowing down the scope of my analysis in 
this way.  
First, the phenomena occupying the left quadrants—top and bottom—have 
already been widely discussed in the literatures on privacy, self-presentation, and 
“opacity respect” (see, e.g., Nagel 1998; Velleman 2001; Bruin 2010; Carter 2011). 
Since I have little to add to those sophisticated discussions, I set privacy public-
identity power to one side here. 
Second, transparency-appraisal power is particularly significant to us as 
persons: as beings capable of responding to reasons. Possessing this power, I shall 
argue, is necessary for the fulfilment of our interest in what I call socially effective 
practical agency. Lacking this power results in distinctive harms (and wrongs), 
 Privacy Transparency 
Descriptive properties The power to keep the 
descriptive aspects of 
one’s objective identity 
private 
The power effectively 
to reveal the descriptive 
aspects of one’s 
objective identity 
Appraisal properties The power to keep the 
appraisal aspects of 
one’s objective identity 
(i.e., the kind of person 
one is) private 
The power effectively 
to reveal the appraisal 
aspects of one’s 
objective identity (i.e., 
the kind of person one 
is)  
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which are pervasive in social life, not always acknowledged, and worth discussing 
in their own right. This is not to deny that lacking the power to convey the 
descriptive aspects of our identity (top-right quadrant) also threatens our interests. 
However, these interests differ from the interest in socially effective practical 
agency, on which I wish to concentrate here.  
 From now on, my discussion will thus concern transparency-appraisal 
power. This can be more precisely defined as follows.  
 
Transparency-appraisal power: A has transparency-appraisal power, 
relative to a given public P, if and only if, were A to act non-deceptively 
and openly vis-à-vis P, then, robustly, P would form a reasonably accurate 
picture of the kind of person A is.  
 
Let me elaborate on this definition. I have spoken of transparency-appraisal power 
as the power effectively to reveal the appraisal properties of one’s objective identity. 
But what does it mean to “reveal” one’s identity, and to do so “effectively”? I reveal 
who I am when I act without hiding certain aspects of my identity (i.e., I act openly) 
and without trying to deceive others about the type of person that I am (i.e., I act 
non-deceptively).  
In turn, I reveal my identity effectively only to the extent that others 
reasonably accurately perceive what I show them. If I am a generous person, but 
everyone perceives me as selfish, I may have the power to reveal my objective 
identity—i.e., to do generous things—but my exercise of this power is, in one sense, 
ineffective. Others still do not see me as the kind of person that I am.  
That said, possession of transparency-appraisal power does not require 
others to have a perfect picture of the kind of person one is. Such perfect match 
would be too much to ask for, given the complexities involved in social interaction. 
But transparency-appraisal power does require others’ picture of the kind of person 
one is to be reasonably accurate: not too far from the truth. For present purposes, 
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we need not settle on any specific “reasonable accuracy” criterion, since the cases 
of transparency-appraisal disempowerment I will discuss are such that the criterion 
isn’t met, under any plausible specification of what counts as reasonable. 
Finally, the fact that others happen to form an adequate picture of me does 
not suffice for me to possess transparency-appraisal power. After all, their “getting 
me right” could be a fluke. This explains the qualifier “robustly” in the definition 
offered above. If people’s seeing me for who I am is a coincidence or a fluke, then 
it is not clear in what sense I possess transparency-appraisal power. Possessing this 
power requires that others’ appraisals be responsive to my behaviour and character. 
Those appraisals, therefore, must be reasonably accurate robustly across the 
different types of behaviour and character I could (non-deceptively) display. 
So defined, transparency-appraisal power can be more or less 
comprehensive, depending on how many appraisal aspects of one’s identity one has 
the power accurately to convey to a given public; it can be more or less local or 
global, depending on the size of the public relative to which one possesses this 
power; and it can be shallower or deeper, depending on how central to one’s identity 
the properties relative to which one possesses transparency-appraisal power are.  
The negation of transparency-appraisal power is what I call transparency-
appraisal disempowerment. This form of public-identity disempowerment affected 
Al from Messiah. His near and dear had an accurate—positive—image of the kind 
of person he was, but only because he happened to be a good man. If he had been a 
different kind of person—say, petty and irascible—and had not concealed his 
character flaws, others’ appraisal of him would have remained identical. That 
appraisal, recall, was guided by the Messiah script, according to which, as “the 
chosen one,” Al’s actions were virtuous by default. Relative to the people around 
him (public “P”), Al’s transparency-appraisal disempowerment was comprehensive 
and deep.  
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III. Structural vs agential transparency-appraisal disempowerment 
In the real world, transparency-appraisal disempowerment comes in two main 
forms—structural and agential—each of which includes two subtypes.5 In what 
follows, I describe these forms of disempowerment, and show that they lie behind 
a variety of familiar social phenomena.  
 
Figure 2: Forms of transparency-appraisal disempowerment 
 
Structural disempowerment  
Disempowerment is structural when its existence can be best explained by 
reference to the make-up of the background societal code, rather than by pointing 
to the actions or omissions of particular agents. By a “societal code” I mean the 
categorization framework, norms, associations, metaphors, and expectations that 
form a society’s interpretive code for making sense of the world. The idea of a 
societal code, as I employ it here, is roughly equivalent to what William Sewell Jr. 
(1992, 7–8) calls a social “schema.”6 In his words, a schema involves “not only the 
array of binary oppositions that make up a given society’s fundamental tools of 
thought, but also the various conventions, recipes, scenarios, principles of action, 
and habits of speech and gesture built up with these fundamental tools” (Ibid).7 
 
5 The point that power (or the lack thereof) may have both structural and agential origins is well 
recognized. For critical discussion, see Dowding (2008).  
6 Sewell, in turn, draws on the work of Anthony Giddens.  
7 See also the discussion of Sewell’s work offered by Sally Haslanger (2012, 461 ff.), from which I 












Schemas, as Sally Haslanger points out, are the society-specific “common ground” 
enabling individuals to decode one another’s behaviour (Haslanger 2012, chap. 
17).8 A societal code, then, includes a categorization framework, but goes beyond 
that, also encompassing patterns of use of that framework, as well as norms, 
conventions, model scenarios, and so forth.  
Structural disempowerment—namely, disempowerment traceable to 
features of the relevant societal code—comes in two variants. In both of them, 
societal codes provide background “scripts” predetermining (or severely 
constraining) individuals’ thoughts and behaviour vis-à-vis certain classes of 
people, in a way analogous to how the Messiah-assumption framed people’s 
thoughts and attitudes towards Al in our opening scenario.9 
The first, which I call default property combination, obtains when societal 
codes assume or exclude “by default” the co-occurrence of certain properties, 
including appraisal properties. Consider how black men in the United States are 
often automatically marked as dangerous, independently of the actions they 
perform (e.g., Crenshaw 1991, 1253). For example, by harmlessly jogging in a 
wealthy, white neighbourhood, a black man is exposed to the risk of being stopped 
by police and interrogated (The Atlantic 2015). This is because a black man is 
assumed to be “not wealthy” by default, and therefore up to no good when engaging 
in a typically middle-class activity in a wealthy area of town. In this sense, the black 
man is transparency-appraisal disempowered: he shows himself for the kind of 
person he is—law-abiding, professionally successful, and with middle-class 
habits—and yet he is perceived as someone altogether different (see also Krause 
2013; Eidelson 2013, 221–22).  
 
8 Haslanger’s discussion of “common ground” draws on Robert Stalnaker’s work. My analysis in 
this paragraph is indebted to Haslanger’s.  
9 Haslanger (2012, 462) uses the notion of a script to characterize the function of social schemas. 
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Similarly, several societal codes tend to exclude the co-occurrence of the 
properties “being a woman,” “being an effective leader,” and “being a good 
mother.” When this is so, it is unlikely, at times impossible, for a woman to establish 
herself as an effective leader and a good mother, even when she possesses the 
necessary skills and character traits. Here too, the public’s negative appraisal of her 
professional and private self is guided by a societal script, which rules out certain 
property-combinations. She is thus transparency-appraisal disempowered. These 
familiar examples show how default property-combination may lie behind what we 
ordinarily call stereotypes, generalizations, and prejudices (cf. Fricker 2007, sec. 
2.1).  
The second form of structural disempowerment, which I call defective 
categorization, occurs when a categorization framework—itself part of a societal 
code—is insufficiently rich and nuanced. Defective categorization can depend on 
the absence/presence of certain properties in the relevant framework, or on how the 
properties’ satisfaction-conditions are specified within that framework.10 
Consider a societal code like ours, where the categorization framework 
includes the property—in fact, the slur—“being a slut.” This is a derogatory term 
applied to women perceived to have liberal sexual mores, automatically implying 
that these women are dirty, untrustworthy, and generally subpar. There are many 
things one could say about the ills associated with this slur (beginning with 
misogyny), but one is particularly relevant to transparency-appraisal 
disempowerment.  
As studies have shown, the term “slut” has a consistently negative 
connotation, but no fixed specification (Armstrong et al. 2014). Different people 
have different views about what it takes to qualify as “a slut.” For some, wearing 
revealing clothes counts; for others, being “a lot around boys” counts; for others 
 
10 On this type of disempowerment, cf. the notion of “hermeneutical injustice” in Fricker (2007), 
chap. 7.  
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still, having multiple boyfriends is the key, and so forth. As sociologist Elizabeth 
Armstrong stated, commenting on research she conducted on a U.S. college 
campus: “The term is so vague and slippery that no one knows what a slut was or 
no one knows what you have to do to be that … It circulated around, though, so 
everyone could worry about it being attached to them” (reported in Khazan 2014). 
This slipperiness disempowers women in public-identity construction, insofar as 
they are vulnerable to being ascribed a negative appraisal property, without being 
in a position to even know what they need to do in order to avoid it. The ambiguous 
specification of the property’s satisfaction-conditions has a disempowering effect. 
Alternatively, consider a categorization framework that lacks the property 
“transgender.” Under such a framework, those whose gender identities are not 
aligned with their biological sex lack the tools to convey their identity, including 
the appraisal aspects of it. If they openly showed themselves for the kinds of persons 
they are, they would fail: their behaviour would be routinely misinterpreted. Even 
today—i.e., in a world in which the category has some recognition—transgender 
people are susceptible to transparency-appraisal disempowerment. Just to mention 
one example, in Virginia, two transgender women were recently denied renewal of 
their drivers’ licenses on account that they were deceptively misrepresenting their 
gender (NYT Editorial Board 2015). They were negatively appraised as being 
dishonest, when in fact they were just trying to show who they were. 
 
Agential disempowerment 
Transparency-appraisal disempowerment is agential when it is best explained by 
reference to the behaviour of specific agents. This form of disempowerment again 
comes in two variants. The first is what I call action-based disempowerment. It 
occurs when particular agents actively impair someone’s public-identity 
construction. 
Consider, for instance, an employee bullied by her boss. The boss may 
spread false rumours about the employee’s character, or may publicly emphasize 
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negative aspects of her performance. In those circumstances, the employee’s own 
actions are not the determinants of her public identity at the workplace. Objectively, 
she may be a good and conscientious colleague, but the boss’s deliberate 
misconstrual of her behaviour creates the public image of a second-rate, 
untrustworthy worker.  
The second type of agential transparency-appraisal disempowerment is 
what I call omission-based disempowerment. It occurs when individuals lack the 
ability to create a faithful public representation of themselves due to others’ failure 
to provide them with the means of doing so. This type of disempowerment may 
accompany, e.g., cultural exclusion. Consider refugees who, not knowing the local 
language and societal code, lack the means to integrate within their host societies. 
This may cause them to experience comprehensive transparency-appraisal 
disempowerment. For example, as discussed in the context of the 2015 European 
refugee crisis, some young male refugees may need advice on how to approach 
women in their host societies (The Economist 2016). Actions that count as 
appropriate under one code may well qualify as rude or threatening under another. 
If access to the cultural knowledge and know-how necessary for integration is not 
made available, culturally unaware refugees will be unable successfully to show 
themselves for the kinds of people they are.  
The typology I have just presented is meant to shed light on different real-
world manifestations of transparency-appraisal disempowerment, and to provide a 
framework enabling us better to detect them. But once we detect transparency-
appraisal disempowerment in a given context, should we immediately conclude that 
some bad—if not some wrong—has occurred?  
IV. Transparency-appraisal disempowerment and treating people as 
individuals 
Manifestly, transparency-appraisal disempowerment can render its victims—such 
as racial minorities, women, bullied employees, and refugees—unfairly 
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disadvantaged or socially subordinated. To that extent, it is instrumentally bad for 
them: it gives rise to bad consequences. Moreover, those consequences are often 
wrong: impermissible by the lights of familiar moral principles.  
 While these are important considerations, in what follows I want to examine 
whether transparency-appraisal disempowerment is morally problematic 
independently of its contingent consequences. An affirmative answer to this 
question would allow us to vindicate the normative significance of this 
phenomenon as such, and not only “vicariously,” by virtue of its harmful effects.  
 One natural suggestion is that transparency-appraisal disempowerment is 
troublesome because it violates the “individuality principle”: the idea that we 
should treat people as individuals.11  According to this explanation, the publics 
involved in transparency-appraisal disempowerment wrong their victims by failing 
to attend to their individuality. Instead of responding to them based on their actions 
and choices, they respond to them based on broad generalizations that apply to them 
qua members of certain groups: e.g., blacks, women, immigrants, and so forth 
(Blum 2004, 272–73; Lippert-Rasmussen 2011).  
 There are various interpretations of the “individuality principle,” but 
Benjamin Eidelson’s is particularly instructive, and I focus on it in what follows.12 
On Eidelson’s view, when we judge an agent Y, we treat her as an individual only 
if we give “reasonable weight to evidence of the ways Y has exercised her 
autonomy [—i.e., to the actions and choices Y has made—], where this evidence is 
reasonably available and relevant to the determination at hand” (Eidelson 2013, 
216; 2016, 144–45).13  
 
11 I thank an anonymous reviewer for inviting me to discuss this principle. 
12 Beeghly (2018) helpfully systematizes these various interpretations and offers critical discussions 
of all of them. 
13 Eidelson states two individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for treating persons as 
individuals. Here, I only include his first condition, since it is the most relevant to our discussion. 
The second condition reads as follows: “if X’s judgments concern Y’s choices, these judgments are not 
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 This principle has much independent appeal and seems able to capture what 
makes us uneasy about prominent instances of transparency-appraisal 
disempowerment. For example, those who automatically perceive blacks as violent 
or women as poor leaders typically do so because they fail to look beyond these 
people’s skin colour and gender, ignoring reasonably available evidence about their 
personal qualities.   
But while the individuality principle correctly captures one way in which 
transparency-appraisal disempowerment may be problematic, it is ill-suited to 
explain what is troublesome about this form of disempowerment as such. Several 
instances of transparency-appraisal disempowerment are, in fact, not accompanied 
by violations of the individuality principle.  
Consider cases of defective categorization. Here, publics do take evidence 
into account, but their interpretation of this evidence results in disempowerment 
due to deficiencies in the categorization frameworks they employ. As we have seen, 
without an appropriately rich and nuanced concept of “transgender,” the actions 
and behaviours of someone born a male but who presents herself as a woman (and 
vice versa) are likely to be misjudged. This, however, is not due to a failure to take 
individualized evidence into account. 
Or else, consider the following instance of default property combination.14 
Sam is a young gay man, living in a conservative society. He does not come out 
knowing that, were he to show himself for who he is, the public would 
automatically ascribe a series of negative appraisal properties to him. This is so 
demoralizing that Sam conceals his objective identity: he acts and looks like a 
 
made in a way that disparages Y’s capacity to make those choices as an autonomous agent” (Eidelson 
2013, 216). Compare Lippert-Rasmussen’s (2011, 54) interpretation of treating people as individuals. 
14 I thanks Matilda Carter for suggesting an example along these lines. 
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straight guy. People’s appraisal of Sam is positive and does indeed rely on the 
available evidence. To that extent, Sam is treated as an individual. Even so, Sam is 
transparency-appraisal disempowered and his predicament is intuitively 
lamentable. Were he to reveal his objective identity—i.e., to act openly and non-
deceptively—the public’s appraisal of him would no longer be accurate.  
Finally, consider action-based disempowerment of the type suffered by our 
bullied employee. The bully may well judge his victim in light of the evidence—he 
may find her a conscientious colleague—but for whatever reason wants to make 
her life hell. By the same token, those around the victim misjudge her, but not 
because they neglect relevant evidence. They do take evidence into account, it’s 
just that the evidence is distorted by the bully’s rumours. Here too, the individuality 
principle cannot account for what is problematic about transparency-appraisal 
disempowerment as such. 
 Even if, as we have seen, the individuality principle only offers a limited 
explanation of what is non-instrumentally troublesome about transparency-
appraisal disempowerment, it is on the right track. Its core insight—i.e., that our 
status as individual agents is key to any such explanation—is correct. In what 
follows, I develop an alternative explanation, building on this important insight.  
V. Transparency-appraisal disempowerment and socially effective practical 
agency 
Adult humans have practical agency. By this I mean that they are responsive to 
reasons and “reflect on what to do and what attitudes to have” (Shoemaker 2013, 
104). This is why their actions are suitable objects of appraisal, and aptly trigger 
various kinds of reactive attitudes (Shoemaker 2013; Strawson 1962). Praise, 
blame, admiration, disdain, and so forth make sense only to the extent that they are 
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directed at entities capable of reason-sensitive choice and who may thus be 
considered responsible for what they do.  
 I want to suggest that, given persons’ nature as practical agents, it is good, 
including non-instrumentally good, for them to have this nature reflected into social 
reality. When this is so, they enjoy the good of socially effective practical agency.  
 
Socially effective practical agency: A enjoys socially effective practical 
agency, in social context S, if and only if, robustly, the appraisal properties 
ascribed to A in S roughly match the actions that A publicly authors. 
 
The way possession of socially effective practical agency is typically good for us, 
and lack thereof bad, should be fairly transparent. If others’ appraisals of us were 
not robustly responsive to our actions, our access to what Rawls calls the “social 
bases of self-respect” would be significantly compromised. As Rawls (1999, 386) 
puts it, without self-respect “nothing may seem worth doing, or if some things have 
value for us, we lack the will to strive for them.” It is easy to see how lacking 
socially effective practical agency may lead one to develop these feelings. What is 
the point, one might ask, in working hard, in being kind to others, in being a good 
citizen, if all one gets in response is criticism and blame? Furthermore, to the extent 
that we form our picture of ourselves partly based on others’ appraisals, recurrent 
divergence between our actions and others’ reactions is likely to cause significant 
cognitive dissonance and anxiety.   
 These remarks support the broad claim that possessing socially effective 
practical agency is good for us, since it is a means to achieving self-respect and 
other agential goods. This claim is, however, too broad for our purposes. What we 
specifically need to show is that possession of socially effective practical agency is 
also non-instrumentally good for us. How can this be done? 
First, let me note that, for structural reasons, the way non-instrumental 
goods are good cannot be easily articulated. One cannot say: “look, X is good 
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because it leads to Y, which is itself good.” Instead, the best one can do is offer 
examples where the putative good is missing, its absence has no apparent harmful 
effects, and yet those involved appear to be worse off for it. Here are some such 
examples. 
  
Professional recognition: Marc is a biologist. His department proposes him 
for promotion. Based on research and other achievements, he is, in fact, 
deserving of promotion. The university committee promotes him.  Years 
later, Marc discovers that he would have been promoted even if his record 
had been much weaker. This is because everyone assumed him to be “very 
good by default,” on account of the fact that his father is a world-renowned 
scientist. 
 
Romantic love: Frank is a young gentleman. He is honest, hardworking, and 
loyal. He confesses his love to Millie, to which she responds, paraphrasing 
Gwendolen in Oscar Wilde’s The Importance of Being Earnest: “… my 
ideal has always been to love some one of the name of Frank. There is 
something in that name that inspires absolute confidence.” She then goes on 
to explain that she could not love or admire someone with a different 
name.15  
 
Justice I: Tom, a black man, is convicted of sexually assaulting a white 
woman and judged guilty. He had, in fact, assaulted the woman and 
evidence of the assault was available to the judge. Had Tom been innocent, 
however, he would have been convicted all the same due to racial 
 
15  Pettit (2015, 11–12) refers to The Importance of Being Earnest in his analysis of modally 
demanding goods. My discussion in what follows is indebted to Pettit’s. 
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prejudices, just like character Tom Robinson in To Kill a Mockingbird.16  
 
Justice II: Billy is a “golden boy.” Middle-class, athletic, white, good at 
school, polite and well mannered. Inebriated after a school party, he rapes a 
young woman. Billy does not see himself as a rapist, though, and blames 
what has happened on “alcohol” and the “party culture” at his university 
(Levin and Wong 2016). Public opinion and the jury at his trial also refuse 
to conceptualize Billy as a rapist. He is eventually convicted, but his 
punishment is not even remotely as harsh as his deeds call for.17  
 
First, the protagonists in each scenario lack socially effective practical agency. The 
appraisal properties ascribed to Marc, Frank, Tom, and Billy do not robustly match 
the actions that they author. In the cases of Marc, Frank, and Tom those properties 
match the relevant actions, but not robustly so. Marc is rightly seen as 
professionally accomplished, but had his work been mediocre, he would have been 
judged no differently. Frank deserves Millie’s affection, but had he been called 
Sam, Bob, or whatever, he would have lost it, while being exactly the same kind of 
person. Tom is indeed a criminal, but had he been innocent, he would have been 
judged guilty all the same. In the case of Billy, the picture the relevant public forms 
is actually inaccurate: he is seen as a “good boy who has made an excusable 
mistake,” while in fact he is a rapist.  
Second, in each of the scenarios, the actual consequences of a lack of 
socially effective practical agency are either no worse than they ought to be, or even 
 
16 For a discussion of To Kill a Mockingbird in the context of epistemic injustice, see Fricker (2007, 
23ff.). 
17 The image of the “golden boy” is discussed by Kate Manne (2016; 2018, 197–98) in connection 
with the events surrounding Brock Turner’s sexual assault of a young woman. The present scenario 
is inspired by Manne’s discussion. 
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better, for their protagonists. Marc, Frank, and Tom are, respectively, rightly 
promoted, admired, and convicted. Billy, on the other hand, even prudentially 
benefits from the situation, getting away with committing a horrible deed without 
being as heavily sanctioned as he ought to be. 
Third, and crucially for our purposes, something of value seems missing 
from Marc, Frank, Tom, and Billy’s lives. While Marc obtains a professional 
advantage, he lacks the richer good of professional recognition. Upon learning that 
his accomplishments make little difference to how others perceive him, he would 
have reason to be disappointed. Suppose a colleague said to him: “You deservedly 
got promoted, but I guess it’s no big surprise. The same would have happened even 
if your work had been mediocre. Nobody would have noticed. After all, you are so-
and-so’s son.” If I were Marc, this revelation would cause me to reconsider the 
value of my well-earned promotion. Similarly, faced with Millie’s declaration, 
Frank should conclude that while he enjoys her affection, it is far from clear whether 
he enjoys her love, proper (Pettit 2015, chap. 1). Tom is convicted, as he ought to 
be. But he would have been convicted even if innocent and, to that extent, he cannot 
properly be said to enjoy the good of justice. Finally, Billy is lucky to almost get 
away with it, and yet, in a world in which he does, he too does not enjoy the good 
of justice. He is prudentially better off, but morally worse off (cf. Tadros 2020). 
In sum, there would be more genuine value in Marc’s, Frank’s, Tom’s, and 
Billy’s lives, if their agency made a difference to people’s appraisals in the contexts 
under consideration. These scenarios show that having our agency determine 
others’ appraisals of us is valuable not only instrumentally, but constitutively. It 
constitutes other core human goods, including professional recognition, justice, and 
love.18 The paper’s opening scenario, Messiah, makes this point all the more vivid. 
 
18 The goods in question are “modally demanding goods” in Pettit’s (2015) sense: their realization 
requires certain “thinner” goods to be instantiated not only in the actual world, but robustly across 
possible worlds. 
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Upon discovering his lack of socially effective practical agency, Al has reason to 
question the authenticity of the most important relationships and goods in his life: 
it is as if those goods had lost much of their value. Taken together, these 
considerations support my claim that socially effective practical agency is an 
important non-instrumental good for us. 
An objector might worry that the cases I have presented fail to support this 
conclusion. For instance, the objector may share the judgement that, in Justice I, 
Tom is harmed, but insist that a lack of socially effective practical agency is 
explanatorily superfluous. Tom’s being harmed can be accounted for by familiar 
considerations, such as procedural injustice and being subjected to demeaning 
treatment. In Justice II, by contrast, Billy’s lack of socially effective practical 
agency seems to mostly benefit rather than harm him.19 In sum, the worry is that a 
lack of socially effective practical agency may either be explanatorily redundant or 
account for such minute bads as to be virtually negligible. 
I have a few things to say in response. First, let me consider the “explanatory 
redundancy” charge. Even supposing that another explanation is available for the 
harm suffered by Tom in Justice I—a matter to which I shall return shortly—this 
alone wouldn’t suffice to conclude that appeals to socially effective practical 
agency are explanatorily unnecessary. After all, the same thing can be bad for 
several reasons. It is perfectly coherent to argue that someone’s situation is bad both 
because they’re the victims of procedural injustice and because they lack socially 
effective practical agency. Someone unjustly convicted of murder based on racial 
prejudices would be a case in point. He would be the victim of procedural injustice, 
and this procedural injustice would be a manifestation of his broader lack of socially 
effective practical agency. Reference to socially effective practical agency would 
thus allow us to offer a richer explanation of what is bad about his situation. 
 
19 I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for raising this point. 
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Turning to Justice I, though, I am doubtful that an easy alternative 
explanation for the harm suffered by Tom is available. Tom’s conviction is neither 
the product of obvious procedural injustice nor itself an instance of demeaning 
treatment: he is convicted in the presence of reliable evidence of criminal conduct. 
The trouble is that, counterfactually, he would have been convicted even without 
that evidence. In light of this, someone in Tom’s position might well think: “What’s 
the point of behaving well, if I would be judged guilty all the same?” A situation 
prompting this kind of thought is a bad one to be in. To capture this bad, we cannot 
rely on standard accounts of procedural injustice, which focus on what happens in 
the actual world; instead, we must refer to the “modally robust good” of socially 
effective practical agency (cf. Pettit 2015).20  
Let me now turn to Justice II. Billy’s situation, I agree, is not bad in all 
respects. Instrumentally, his lack of socially effective practical agency benefits him. 
But I want to insist that, in one important respect, his life is worse because of it: he, 
too, does not enjoy the good of justice. I offer two considerations in support of my 
insistence. First, if justice is an intrinsic good—as I and many others believe it is—
then a failure to enjoy the good of justice continues to be bad even if it’s 
accompanied by prudential advantages.  
Second, even intuitively, getting away with wrongdoing can be shown to be 
bad for us. To see this, ask yourself what you would wish for your misbehaving 
teenage son, who disrupts lessons, hits classmates, and cheats on his homework (cf. 
Tadros 2020, 232 ff.). Would you prefer that he got away with it, or would you 
prefer that the teacher displayed the right attitudes towards him, reprimanding him 
 
20 As an alternative, one might offer a modally robust account of procedural justice, whereby a 
procedure which does not track the evidence in some relevant non-actual scenarios is unjust, even 
if it tracks the evidence in the actual world, as in Tom’s case. I am sympathetic to this (arguably 
non-standard) suggestion, but reference to Tom’s lack of socially effective practical agency would 
still be illuminating if we accepted it since, as I have already noted, it is key to explaining why the 
procedure at hand is in fact unjust.  
 24 
and penalising him appropriately (e.g., with extra homework)? I think most parents 
who have the good of their children at heart would opt for the scenario in which 
justice is done. Part of the reason is surely instrumental: penalties disincentivize 
future bad behaviour. But part of the reason is intrinsic. I want my child to be treated 
as a responsible agent, even if this is sometimes unpleasant for him.  
Another way to see this is to consider the following scenario. Suppose that, 
on your deathbed, you learn that you committed several wrongful deeds. Nobody, 
however, perceived those deeds as wrongful or reprimanded you for them. You thus 
never got a chance to make amends or have authentic mutual-accountability 
relationships with others. While acknowledging that this state of affairs made life 
easier for you, you will probably also feel that something of genuine value was 
missing from your life. I certainly would. That “something” is a form of socially 
effective practical agency. 
In sum, a lack of socially effective practical agency is far from explanatorily 
redundant. It is necessary to make sense of the harm occurring in Justice I, and 
necessary to understand that, in fact, a harm also occurs in Justice II, albeit 
accompanied by prudential advantages.  
 
The non-instrumental bad of transparency-appraisal disempowerment 
Socially effective practical agency, it should be noted, may be undermined in many 
circumstances, not all of which involve transparency-appraisal disempowerment. 
For example, if P’s appraisal robustly matches actions that A authors in private, A’s 
socially effective practical agency is undermined. This may be the case of citizens 
in East Germany vis-à-vis Stasi spies, who appraised them based on private 
behaviours. In this case, it is a lack of what I have called privacy public-identity 
power that hinders socially effective practical agency. That said, by definition, 
transparency-appraisal disempowerment is always accompanied by a shortfall in 
socially effective practical agency. If others’ appraisals of us do not robustly match 
behaviour that we author, then our acting openly and non-deceptively towards them 
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will not robustly result in them forming an accurate picture of the kinds of people 
we are. 
The fact that a lack of socially effective practical agency always 
accompanies transparency-appraisal disempowerment, in turn, explains what is 
non-instrumentally problematic about instances of such disempowerment, 
including those that the individuality principle was unable to account for.  
 To see this, recall the victim of bullying, judged negatively by her 
colleagues, but not due to their ignoring available evidence. Even if they, and the 
bully, do treat the victim as an individual, her transparency-appraisal 
disempowerment is regrettable, and not merely instrumentally so. Relative to her 
colleagues, the victim of bullying lacks socially effective practical agency: their 
appraisals of her do not match actions she authors, but the bully’s depiction of them.  
Similarly, recall the example involving Sam, who does not come out as gay 
due to a justified fear of being unwarrantedly negatively appraised. While Sam is 
indeed treated as an individual—people appraise him based on evidence about his 
actions—he lacks socially effective practical agency. Others’ appraisals do not 
robustly match his actions: if Sam came out, those appraisals would become 
inaccurate. This is clearly bad for Sam, significantly hindering his agency. 
Finally, remember disempowerment that follows from defective 
categorization frameworks. Here too, the situations of women who run the risk of 
being identified as “sluts,” and of transgender people whose behaviour may be 
systematically misinterpreted, are non-instrumentally bad not because these people 
“fail to be treated as individuals,” but because they lack socially effective practical 
agency.  
I have argued that a focus on the abstract good of socially effective practical 
agency helps us capture what is problematic about transparency-appraisal 
disempowerment as such. Of course, how bad such disempowerment is, even 
independently of its consequences, will rest on many factors. It is certainly 
regrettable if a random passer by negatively judges me in a way that is entirely 
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unresponsive to my actions, but it is hardly a big deal. It is still bad, of course. 
Would I wish it upon myself or anyone else? No. Would I have reason to be 
disappointed, offended or upset if I learnt about the passer-by’s judgement? Yes. 
Still, it is the kind of bad which, if occurring in isolation, should not be much cause 
for concern.  
While some instances of transparency-appraisal disempowerment make so 
little difference to our lives that we should not be particularly concerned about 
them, others are non-instrumentally bad in much more significant ways. Examples 
such as Professional recognition, Messiah, Justice I & II as well as Romantic love 
are cases in point, and so are some of the real-world scenarios discussed throughout 
the paper. How (non-instrumentally) bad any particular instance of transparency-
appraisal disempowerment is depends on many factors, including which social 
context we are focusing on, which publics are involved, and which appraisal 
properties are at stake.  
 
From bad to wrong 
I have argued that transparency-appraisal disempowerment is non-instrumentally 
bad since it undermines the good of socially effective practical agency. Enjoying 
this, like any, good, is something we have an interest in. I now want to suggest that 
transparency-appraisal disempowerment is also prima facie wrong as such. By this 
I mean that, whenever we are faced with transparency-appraisal disempowerment, 
we should be concerned that some wrongdoing might be occurring. Upon 
investigation, we may then discover that such disempowerment is either morally 
unproblematic, or morally problematic in one respect, or all-things-considered 
wrong. Our answer will depend on whether, in the circumstances at hand, the 
interest in gaining transparency-appraisal power is weighty enough to place duties 
on others.  
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This account of the relationship between interests and duties has been 
famously defended by Joseph Raz (1986, chap. 7).21 Consider, for instance, the 
interest in access to nutrition. The weight of this interest can be assumed to place a 
bundle of duties on a variety of agents: including duties to enable individuals to 
access nutrition and to refrain from depriving them of access to nutrition. Whenever 
someone lacks access to nutrition, our moral “alarm bells” should therefore go off.  
To be sure, there may be circumstances in which securing someone’s access 
to nutrition is strictly impossible or unreasonably costly. In that case, the person’s 
interest will fail to generate duties: there will only be a moral reason to provide her 
with nutrition, outweighed by other considerations. Barring such circumstances, 
though, others’ lack of access to nutrition will count as wrongful.  
 A similar line of reasoning applies to the interest in socially effective 
practical agency. This interest will often be weighty enough to place duties on 
others. The duties are again a wide and varied set. They include duties not to 
acquiesce with or reinforce societal codes that foreseeably perpetuate transparency-
appraisal disempowerment, duties not to deliberately or negligently cause such 
disempowerment, and duties to remedy such disempowerment when doing so is 
possible at reasonable cost. Who exactly bears the relevant duties in any given 
instance depends on the specific features of the situation at hand. But, as in the case 
of malnutrition, whenever we are faced with transparency-appraisal 
disempowerment, our moral “alarm bells” should go off. We know that some 
agents’ interest in socially effective practical agency has been undermined, to a 
greater or lesser extent. Provided attending to this interest is possible and not 
unreasonably costly, a setback in the power to effectively reveal the appraisal 
dimension of one’s identity will count as wrongful. 
 
21 Raz advances this idea in the context of a particular account of rights. For simplicity’s sake, I 
prefer to avoid the language of rights here.  
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Of course, just like the non-instrumental bad of transparency-appraisal 
disempowerment, the gravity of the relevant wrong will come in degrees, and vary 
from case to case. It will depend on how deep/shallow, local/global, 
narrow/comprehensive the victim’s disempowerment is, and on the level of agential 
involvement of those who are responsible for the disempowerment in question. 
Holding all else equal, perpetrators of action-based disempowerment likely commit 
a graver wrong than perpetrators of omission-based disempowerment, to the extent 
that the agency of the former is more deeply involved in producing 
disempowerment than that of the latter. Similarly, depending on one’s position 
within a broader social structure, one’s degree of responsibility and 
blameworthiness for structural disempowerment will vary.  
While I cannot offer a precise account of the conditions under which 
transparency-appraisal disempowerment is wrongful—this requires case-by-case 
evaluations—these reflections identify which parameters need to be taken into 
account in making contextual determinations about its wrongness.  
 
VI. Statistical discrimination 
Before concluding, I wish to respond to an important objection: namely that my 
analysis of transparency-appraisal disempowerment commits me to the implausible 
view that statistical discrimination is always wrongful. Showing that this is not the 
case will help lend plausibility to my proposal. 
Statistical discrimination is based not on irrational prejudice, but on 
statistical information about different groups of people. Of course, sometimes such 
information is skewed, but for present purposes, I assume it is accurate. Said 
information reflects the fact that individuals belonging to certain reference classes 
are more likely to bear certain (appraisal) properties. The properties in question 
vary widely, but the most discussed instances of statistical discrimination target 
properties with a negative valence, such as criminality and violence. 
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Some forms of statistical discrimination seem unproblematic. Take the case 
of car insurance, discussed by Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen (2007). Young male 
drivers have to pay higher insurance premiums, because they belong to a reference 
class that is statistically more likely to be involved in accidents. Of course, in a 
world different from ours—e.g., in which we could track drivers’ risk-attitudes at 
reasonable cost, without unduly invading their privacy—premiums should be set 
based on individual-specific evidence rather than evidence about broader reference 
classes. But in light of the technological and epistemic limitations characterizing 
our world, considerations of privacy and efficiency render statistical discrimination, 
in the domain of insurance premiums, justified. Similarly, policies involving 
“women only spaces” are often introduced on the grounds that men are likely to 
constitute a threat to women. Yet few object to such policies, even if they are based 
on statistical generalizations. 22  Here too, considerations of desirability and 
feasibility render finer-grained measures, e.g., where only “safe” men are allowed 
into otherwise “women-only” spaces, unviable.  
Other forms of statistical discrimination, by contrast, make us uneasy and 
have been the object of considerable criticism. These include racial and religious 
profiling in the context of crime and terrorism prevention (for discussion, see Risse 
and Zeckhauser 2004; Lever 2005; Hosein 2018).  
As anticipated, an objector might worry that, from the perspective of 
transparency-appraisal disempowerment, car insurance, women-only spaces, and 
racial profiling are structurally indistinguishable and therefore morally troublesome 
in similar ways. This is because, in all cases of statistical discrimination, certain 
appraisal properties are ascribed to individuals in response to factors other than 
their conduct: e.g., some drivers are deemed accident-prone because they are young 
males, some people are considered dangerous because they are black, Muslim, and 
 
22 I thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this example. I am here setting aside heated debates 
about whether transgender women should be allowed to enter such spaces. 
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so forth. A concern with transparency-appraisal disempowerment, so the worry 
goes, is bound to result in a global condemnation of statistical discrimination. 
In what follows, I show that this worry is misplaced and that transparency-
appraisal disempowerment can in fact help us distinguish between problematic and 
harmless instances of statistical discrimination. To do so, I begin by noting that the 
relation of transparency-appraisal disempowerment to statistical discrimination is 
exactly the reverse of what the objector supposes. Given the nature of statistical 
discrimination, we should actually expect it not to involve this kind of 
disempowerment. After all, to hold that, because an agent A possesses descriptive 
property D (say, belonging to a certain minority), A is more likely to possess 
negative appraisal property N (say, being dangerous) is not as yet to attribute that 
property to A. To confirm whether A possesses property N, we need to obtain 
further evidence of A’s behaviour. Our final judgement and attitudes towards A 
will be responsive to A’s actions, not to factors that have little to do with A’s 
agency. If this is how statistical discrimination works, then A is not negatively 
appraised independently of her actions, hence she is not transparency-appraisal 
disempowered.  
This is how statistical discrimination is meant to work in principle, and how 
it sometimes works in practice, such as in the case of insurance premiums and 
“women only spaces.” Insurers do not approach younger drivers already labelling 
them as reckless. Instead, they propose a certain standardized insurance package 
based on broad statistical regularities, where it is understood that those regularities 
are just proxies which might well misfire. Similarly, while the rationale behind 
“women only spaces” appeals to the way in which mixed spaces may 
disproportionately put women in danger, men qua men are not routinely approached 
by women, or society at large, as if they were dangerous criminals. Furthermore, 
the rationale for “women only spaces” is strongest in those contexts—e.g., 
prisons—where men have a proven track-record of dangerous behaviour, and where 
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more careful individualized evaluation would be infeasible as well as undesirable 
on privacy grounds.  
Things looks different, however, when we turn to racial profiling, at least 
as it is practiced today. Often, minorities targeted by this form of profiling are 
treated in a way that assumes their possession of negative property N, even if a 
much more respectful treatment would be both desirable and feasible. This, in turn, 
amounts to transparency-appraisal disempowerment, with the associated denial of 
socially effective practical agency. 
Consider the following episode, narrated by the protagonist, a black jogger: 
“I had the misfortune of jogging early in the morning through my almost all-white 
neighborhood in [a] small city near Boston. There was no crime in progress; a cop 
just thought I looked suspicious, pointed a gun at me and forced me to the ground 
while peppering his orders with lots of curse words. He demanded ID and grilled 
me about ‘what I was doing in the neighborhood’. Then he left me with a sarcastic 
‘have a nice day’” (The Atlantic 2015).  
The officer treats the jogger like a criminal by default. The officer 
eventually lets the jogger go. But the fact that the officer, at some point, stops 
treating the jogger like a criminal does not cancel the fact that he did treat him like 
a criminal independently of his behaviour, when a different, respectful option was 
available. One can politely ask someone for ID, without pointing any guns. And 
one can say: “Sorry for the inconvenience.” In acting the way he does, the officer 
contributes to the particular form of disempowerment I called “default property 
combination” and thereby undermines the jogger’s socially effective practical 
agency (see also Eidelson 2013, 221–22).23 
Several reports from targets of racial profiling corroborate this conclusion. 
For instance, reflecting on his experience of racial profiling, a twenty-five year old 
 
23 This is a case in which, I think, a setback in socially effective practical agency overlaps with “not 
being treated as an individual” in Eidelson’s (2013; 2016) framework. 
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man from Kentucky declared: “I don’t do drugs, I’m not a drug dealer, I work every 
day. I should only be judged by the content of my character.” A thirty-seven year 
old man, this time from New York, observes: “What’s infuriating is having another 
man treat you as a criminal based on nothing more than your appearance” (reported 
by Srinivas 2014). And a participant in an inquiry launched by the Ontario Human 
Rights Commission on the human costs of racial profiling wondered, thinking about 
the future of her kids: “When you are a young person and people think you are bad, 
what is the point of behaving well anyway […]?” (Ontario Human Rights 
Commission 2003). 
 The list could continue, but these illustrative reports should suffice to 
convey the feelings of those who have been targets of racial profiling. These are 
precisely the feelings we would expect to find in people who lack socially effective 
practical agency. And to the extent that racial profiling involves a denial of socially 
effective practical agency, it is at least pro tanto wrong, irrespective of its supposed 
or real benefits for society’s overall safety.  
If this is right, rather than condemning all forms of statistical discrimination, 
the notion of transparency-appraisal disempowerment contributes to explaining 
what is problematic about some of them. I am using the word “contributes” for a 
reason, which is worth acknowledging explicitly. When discrimination is wrong, it 
is often wrong on several grounds: it may be demeaning, distributively unfair, or 
reinforce problematic social hierarchies (Eidelson 2013). These sources of 
wrongness likely also apply to instances of racial and religious profiling, especially 
since the targeted groups already tend to be socially disadvantaged. All I mean to 
suggest is that, from the perspective of transparency-appraisal disempowerment 
too, such forms of discrimination come out as distinctively problematic, in a way 
that car-insurance policies and women-only spaces do not.  
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VII. Conclusion 
I have characterized an important and pervasive phenomenon—public-identity 
disempowerment—considered a particularly salient instance of it, and explained 
why it is non-instrumentally bad, and prima facie wrong. My aim in doing so has 
been to provide diagnostic and critical tools allowing for a more nuanced evaluation 
of social practices and relations. Having a label denoting this particular wrong may 
itself empower its victims and provide them with better resources with which to 
convey their predicament. Furthermore, showing that public-identity 
disempowerment, in its transparency-appraisal variant, often accompanies a wide 
variety of otherwise rather different social phenomena can help us better understand 
all of them. If I am right, those who suffer from negative stereotypes and those who 
profit from positive ones, those who are accused by default and those who can “get 
away with it” are all candidate victims of the bad (and, possibly, wrong) of 
transparency-appraisal disempowerment. Although their situations look different, 
and—needless to say—the seriousness varies from case to case, their practical 
agency is prevented from being socially effective. To a greater or lesser degree, 
then, their lives are impoverished as human lives in the way Al’s in Messiah is. 
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